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The U.S. current account deficit narrowed noticeably 
in 2001. Both imports and exports of goods and 
services fell during the year in response to a global 
weakening of economic activity. The decline in the 
deficit followed a substantial widening during most 
of the past decade. For 2001, a smaller merchandise 
trade deficit and a slightly larger surplus in trade in 
services offset a continued widening of the deficit on 
investment income. 
Meager foreign economic growth and the contin-
ued real appreciation of the dollar throughout the 
year induced a $61 billion decline in the value of U.S. 
exports of goods and services. The slowing in the 
U.S. economy caused imports of goods and services 
to fall even more—$89 billion. In the third quarter 
the deficit declined further, but only temporarily, 
because payments for imported services were reduced 
by a one-time large estimated insurance payment 
from foreign insurers (reported on an accrual basis) 
related to the destruction caused by the terrorist 
attacks of September 11. The net effect of these 
developments was a $28 billion narrowing in the 
goods and services deficit for 2001 (table 1). 
Table 1. U.S. international transactions, 1997-2001 
Billions of dollars except as noted 
Item  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  Change, 
2000-01 
Trade in goods and services, net  -108  -167  -262  -376  -348  28 
Goods  -198  -247  -346  -452  -427  25 
Services  90  80  83  76  79  3 
Investment income, net  13  -1  -9  -10  -14  -4 
Compensation of employees, net  -5  -5  -5  -5  -5  0 
Unilateral current transfers, net  -41  -44  -49  -54  -51  3 
Current account balance  -140  -217  -324  -445  -417  28 
Official capital, net  18  -27  55  36  1  -35 
Private capital, net  254  172  322  407  455  48 
Financial account balance  272  145  377  443  456  13 
Capital account balance  0  1  -3  1  1  0 
Statistical discrepancy  -132  72  -49  1  -39  -40 
MEMO 
Current account balance as percent of GDP  -1.7  -2.5  -3.5  -4.5  -4.1  .4 (Percentage point change.) 
NOTE. Here and in the following tables, components may not sum to totals 
because of rounding. 
SOURCE. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA), U.S. international transactions accounts. 
The deficit in investment income widened slightly. 
Higher net payments on the growing net portfolio 
liability position were nearly offset by higher net 
receipts from direct investment. Weak growth abroad 
and the effect of lower oil prices on the profitability 
of U.S. energy companies lowered the return on U.S. 
foreign direct investment assets; slower growth in the 
United States reduced the return on foreign direct 
investment assets in the United States by an even 
greater amount. The deficit on unilateral transfers 
narrowed slightly. 
Although smaller than the deficit in 2000, the U.S. 
current account deficit in 2001 was still large relative 
to U.S. historical experience (chart 1). The U.S. cur-
rent account deficit is the counterpart of a net inflow 
of foreign capital that represents a source of saving 
(of more than $400 billion) to help finance U.S. 
domestic investment. To finance the U.S. current 
account deficit, net private capital flowed in at a 
record pace in 2001 and included unprecedented net 
inflows through private securities transactions. Net 
official capital outflows were slight. The statistical 
discrepancy in the U.S. international accounts was negative, indicating either small unrecorded net 
capital outflows or an underreporting of the current 
account deficit. 
Chart 1. U.S. external balances, 1970-2001 
[graph plotting two lines: Net private capital, and Current account balance,  recording their percent of GDP from 1970 through 2001. In 1970, current  account balance starts at about .3%, net private capital at about -1%. in  1972, balance is about -.4%, capital about -.2%. In 1975, balance is about  1.2%, capital about -1.5%. In 1977 balance and capital are about -.8%. In  1980, balance is about .2%, capital about -1%. In 1987, balance is about  -3.4%, capital about 2.3%. In 1991 Balance is about 0%, capital about .3%.  In 2000 balance is about -4.5%, capital about 4%. In 2001, balance is about  -4%, capital about 4.5%.] 
NOTE. The data are annual. 
SOURCE. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA). 
MAJOR ECONOMIC INFLUENCES ON 
U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS. 
Several factors had a significant influence on U.S. 
international transactions in 2001: cyclical move-
ments in U.S. and foreign economic activity, a decline 
in primary commodity prices, movements in U.S. 
international price competitiveness, swings in the 
rates of return on real and financial assets at home 
and abroad, and the terrorist attacks of September 11. 
U.S. Economic Activity. 
In 2001 the U.S. economy turned in its weakest 
performance in a decade, and the slowing pace of 
activity contributed to a decline in U.S. imports. Real 
gross domestic product increased at an annual rate of 
3/4 percent in the first half of the year and remained 
virtually stagnant in the second half (table 2). 
Although the effects of the weakening economy were 
broadly felt, the manufacturing sector was especially 
hard hit. Faced with slumping demand both in the 
United States and abroad, manufacturers cut produc-
tion aggressively to limit excessive buildups of inven-
tories relative to sales. In addition, businesses sharply 
reduced their investment spending with particularly 
dramatic cuts in outlays for high-technology equip-
ment. Firms trimmed payrolls through most of the 
year, and by year-end the unemployment rate moved 
up 1
3/4 percentage points, to around 5
3/4 percent. Job 
losses were especially large following the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, which had extremely 
adverse effects on certain sectors of the economy— 
most notably the air transportation and hospitality 
industries. 
Growth of household spending slowed last year but 
remained sufficiently strong to provide an important 
source of support to overall final demand. Consump-
tion spending was stimulated last year by lower inter-
est rates, cuts in federal taxes, declining energy 
prices, and, in the autumn, higher spending on motor 
vehicles arising from automaker's aggressive market-
ing of financial incentives to consumers. After Sep-
tember 11, spending declined in certain travel- and 
tourism-related categories including air transporta-
tion, hotels and motels, and recreation services. 
Favorable mortgage interest rates helped sustain real 
expenditures on housing. In all, however, the slowing 
of household spending, combined with the sharp drop 
in business spending, led to a decline in real imports 
in 2001. 
Foreign Economic Activity. 
A substantial weakening of economic growth in for-
eign economies in 2001 contributed to a decline in 
U.S. exports. Early in the year, activity abroad was 
depressed by high oil prices, the global slump in the 
high-tech sector, and spillover from the U.S. eco-
nomic slowdown. The September terrorist attacks 
further heightened economic uncertainty. The weak-
ening in economic activity abroad prompted some 
foreign central banks to reduce interest rates and 
some foreign governments to take stimulative fiscal 
measures. Despite these actions, growth in foreign 
economies was near zero on average over the year 
(table 2). 
Among the major foreign industrial economies, the 
weakest performer was Japan, where output declined 
nearly 2 percent and unemployment rose. The dete-
rioration continued a decade-long pattern of poor 
economic performance. Private investment slumped 
as firms slashed capital spending amid a worsened 
outlook for profits. In addition, exports fell sharply; 
the drop in sales of high-tech products was particu-
larly steep. Private consumption remained sluggish 
because of declines in household incomes. The 
scaling-back of the large public works programs of 
recent years more than offset the effect on growth 
from the additional spending contained in several 
supplemental budgets. 
The Canadian economy, which had been growing 
at a rapid pace, slowed abruptly. Real GDP in Canada rose less than 1 percent last year after growth of more 
than 3 percent in 2000. A key factor in the slowing 
was the sharp drop-off in Canadian exports to the 
United States. An inventory correction depressed out-
put, while consumption was buoyed by continued 
employment growth, tax cuts, and a housing boom. 
Table 2. Change in real GDP in the United States and abroad, 1998-2001 
Percent, annual rate 











United States  4.8  4.4  2.8  .5  6.5  4.0  1.6  .8  .1 
Total foreign  1.6  4.8  4.0  .1  5.4  5.4  2.6  .0  .0 
Asian emerging markets  -2.0  8.7  6.3  .7  8.0  8.0  4.6  -1.6  3.0 
China  9.5  4.1  8.0  7.5  7.4  9.7  6.3  7.9  7.1 
Indonesia  -18.0  6.0  7.3  1.2  .4  9.1  5.7  1.2  1.0 
Korea  -5.2  13.8  5.1  4.4  12.5  7.7  2.6  3.0  5.8 
Malaysia  -10.9  11.5  6.4  -.9  9.6  6.1  6.7  -5.8  4.3 
Philippines  -2.3  5.1  3.9  3.8  3.4  5.0  2.9  3.5  4.0 
Taiwan  3.4  6.5  3.9  -1.8  3.9  6.4  1.5  -5.8  2.3 
Latin America  1.3  4.3  4.5  -1.6  5.6  6.9  2.2  -1.2  -2.0 
Argentina  -.5  -.9  -1.9  -9.9  2.8  -4.2  .4  -1.7  -17.4 
Brazil  -1.1  4.2  4.1  -2.3  4.5  4.2  4.1  .4  -5.0 
Mexico  2.9  5.4  4.9  -1.5  6.7  8.0  1.8  -1.6  -1.3 
Venezuela  -4.6  -4.1  5.7  1.6  -3.0  8.4  2.9  2.1  1.1 
Canada  4.2  5.1  3.5  .9  5.6  4.0  3.1  1.0  .7 
European Union  2.3  4.4  3.3  .6  5.2  3.8  2.8  .9  .2 
Japan  -1.3  .6  2.3  -1.9  -.8  5.6  -1.0  -.4  -3.3 
NOTE. Aggregate measures are weighted by moving bilateral shares in U.S. 
exports of merchandise. Annual data are four-quarter changes. Half-yearly data 
are calculated as Q4/Q2 or Q2/Q4 changes at an annual rate. 
Note on Asian emerging markets: 
Weighted average of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
Note on Latin America: 
Weighted average of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and 
Venezuela. 
SOURCE. Various national sources. 
The euro area eked out an increase in real GDP 
of less than 1 percent, a sharp slowing from the 
3 percent increase in 2000. Activity was restrained 
by declines in fixed investment and inventory 
investment and a continuation of sluggish growth in 
consumption. 
Growth in most emerging market economies in 
Asia and Latin America slowed sharply last year. 
Asian developing economies were particularly hard 
hit by the falloff in demand for their high-tech exports 
and by the slowing of activity among their industrial-
country trading partners. High-tech exports from the 
region began to decline late in 2000. The emerging 
Asian economies particularly dependent on such 
exports—Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Singapore— 
were among the first to slow in the recent global 
downturn, and real GDP growth in these economies 
turned negative in the latter part of 2000 or early 
in 2001. However, as 2001 neared conclusion, global 
high-tech demand appeared to stabilize, and mount-
ing evidence suggested that the region was moving 
toward recovery. In China, the available data indicate 
that growth remained strong last year, notwithstand-
ing some slowing of export growth; activity was 
supported by ongoing fiscal stimulus and record 
inflows of foreign direct investment. 
Economic activity in the major Latin American 
economies weakened significantly in 2001. Real GDP 
in Mexico contracted steadily, with a sharp reduction 
in export demand from the United States contributing 
to a decline in confidence and a marked weakening of 
domestic demand. Accordingly, the drop in Mexico's 
exports was matched by an almost identical drop in 
its imports. The situation in Argentina, already diffi-
cult when the year began, deteriorated further; the 
country eventually defaulted on its debt and, in early 
2002, abandoned its fixed exchange rate regime. By 
the end of the year, the Argentine economy was 
essentially in free fall, and real GDP declined nearly 
10 percent for 2001. In Brazil, real activity also 
contracted; performance there was constrained by a 
severe drought and by spillovers from the crisis in 
Argentina that triggered a rapid tightening of mone-
tary policy in an effort to defend the currency. 
Primary Commodity Prices. 
Oil prices declined significantly during 2001 from 
the unusually high levels that prevailed in 2000. The 
spot price of West Texas intermediate (WTI) crude 
decreased about $10 per barrel during the year, with 
much of the decline occurring after September 11 (chart 2). During the first eight months of 2001, 
weakened demand for oil and increased non-OPEC 
supply were largely offset by OPEC production 
restraint, and the spot price of WTI averaged $28 per 
barrel. After a brief, sharp uptick in oil prices in 
the wake of the terrorist attacks, oil prices dropped 
sharply in response to a decline in jet fuel consump-
tion, weaker economic activity, and reassurances 
from Saudi Arabia that supply would be forthcoming. 
During the fourth quarter, some members of OPEC 
appeared unwilling to continue sacrificing market 
share to defend higher oil prices, and oil prices con-
tinued to drift lower. In late December, however, 
OPEC worked out an arrangement with several non-
OPEC producers (Angola, Mexico, Norway, Oman, 
and Russia) in which OPEC agreed to reduce its 
production targets an additional 1.5 million barrels 
per day, and the other producers agreed to reduce oil 
supplies a total of 462,500 barrels per day. 
Chart 2. Oil prices, 1986-2001 
[graph plotting two lines: West Texas Intermediate, and U.S. Import,  of dollars per barrel from 1986 through 2001. In 1986, WTI started  about $23, USI about $26. Near the end of 1986 WTI and USI  dropped to about, $11. They vary about $22 to $12 until they spike  early 1991: WTI to about $36, USI to about $30. In early 1994, WTI  is about $15, USI about $12. By the end of 1996 they are up to about  WTI $25, USI $22.50. They go mostly down, hitting a low in 1999 of  about WTI $10, USI $11. Then prices go up, in 2000 WTI hitting about  $34.50, USI about $30. At the end of 2001 WTI is about $19, USI  about $16.] 
NOTE. The data are monthly. 
SOURCE. Wall Street Journal and BEA. 
Prices of non-oil primary commodities, which fell 
steadily through most of 2001, reached a fourteen-
year low in October (chart 3). Prices stabilized near 
year-end as the prospect of improving global eco-
nomic conditions led to a slight uptick in prices, 
especially in the cyclically sensitive categories of 
agricultural raw materials and metals. Prices of non-
oil primary commodities had fallen from the onset 
of the Asian crisis, in 1997, through the first half of 
1999, a period of weak global demand for these 
commodities and large increases in supply that ema-
nated from the high prices of the mid-1990s (espe-
cially for agricultural products). Prices rebounded 
slightly in the second half of 1999 with the pickup 
in global economic growth, but they subsequently 
fell through most of 2000 as the dollar climbed and 
global economic activity decelerated. 
Chart 3. Prices of world non-oil primary commodities, 1986-2001 
[graph of price change from 1986 through 2001,  based on it being 100 in 1990. In early 1986 it was about  85. Mid 1986 it hit a maximum low of about 76. Up until  1988, hitting about 120. Slopes down hitting about 93.  Up again, maxing at about 124 in 1996. Mid 1999 it  hits about 87.5, then up to about 95 in the beginning  of 2000. By the end of 2001 it is down to about 82.] 
NOTE. The data are monthly. 
SOURCE. International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, 
index of non-oil commodity prices in dollars. 
U.S. Price Competitiveness. 
Changes in the price competitiveness of U.S. export-
and import-competing industries depend on the rela-
tive movements of inflation rates here and abroad 
and on changes in the foreign exchange value of the 
dollar. In the United States, a sharp drop in energy 
prices reduced the inflation rate during 2001 (chart 4). 
Chart 4. Change in U.S. and foreign consumer price indexes, 
1998-2001 
[bar graph of United States and Foreign from 1998  to 2001.  In 1998 United States was about 1.5%, foreign about 0.9%.  In 1999 United States was about 2.6%, foreign about 0.8%.  In 2000 United States was about 3.3%, foreign about 1.2%.  In 2001 United States was about 1.9%, foreign about 0.8%. 
NOTE. Fourth quarter to fourth quarter. The index for foreign countries is a 
weighted average of foreign G-7 countries. The weights are shares in foreign 
GDP. 
Inflation of core consumer prices (consumer prices 
less food and energy items) leveled off and, by some 
measures, moved lower last year. Also helping to keep a lid on core consumer prices were weakening 
economic activity, the indirect effects of falling 
energy prices on firm's costs, the sustained vigorous 
productivity performance by U.S. workers, and con-
tinued strong competitive pressures. 
Foreign inflation also fell in 2001. Inflation rates in 
the foreign Group of Seven (G-7) countries were, on 
average, lower than U.S. rates (chart 4). The easing 
of average inflation abroad, as in the United States, 
reflected the weakness of activity and the net decline 
in global oil prices over the year. In addition, all 
major foreign industrial countries operated below 
their estimated potential rates of output (some consid-
erably so). Passthrough effects from the depreciation 
of exchange rates in Canada, the United Kingdom, 
and the euro area were barely perceptible. 
The dollar's average foreign exchange value grew 
stronger through most of the year, appreciating 
3 1/4 percent on a real trade-weighted basis in terms of 
an index of a broad group of U.S. trading partners 
(chart 5). The dollar continued to rise despite mount-
ing evidence of weakening U.S. economic activity 
and a significant easing of monetary policy by the 
Federal Open Market Committee. Market partici-
pants may have felt that the falloff in economic 
growth in foreign economies and expectations that 
the United States offered stronger prospects for eco-
nomic growth in the future outweighed disappoint-
ing U.S. economic performance in the near term. The 
dollar's average foreign exchange value against 
the currencies of other major industrial countries 
recorded a net increase of 8 percent over the year as 
a whole. The dollar also strengthened, but by a lesser 
amount, against an index of the currencies of the 
most important developing-country trading partners 
of the United States. 
Chart 5. Foreign exchange value of the U.S. dollar, 1990-2001 
[Graph plotting three lines: Yen, Euro, and Price-adjusted broad dollar  index, from 1990 through 2001, showing change in exchange value of  the U.S. dollar based on 1996 being 100.  In 1990, yen starts at about 134, euro about 112, index about 107. Yen  jumps to about 146 in mid 1990, then in 1991 all have dropped: yen to  about 120, euro to about 98, index to about 102. Yen is mostly dropping  until 1995, reaching about 77. Euro varied between 119 and 97, ending  at about 92 in 1995. Index varied between 108 and 100, ending at about  97 in 1995. They all go up until 1998, yen hitting about 133, euro about  120, index about 122. The go down a bit in 1999, yen reaching about 114,  euro about 110, index about 114. Beginning of 2000, yen is down to about  94, euro up to about 121, and price index to about 114. They end 2001  with yen at about 117, euro about 146, index about 128.] 
NOTE. Foreign currency units per dollar. The broad index covers a large 
group of important U.S. trading partners. For data before January 1999, the 
restated German mark is used for the euro exchange rate. The data are 
monthly. 
The magnitude of the dollar' s appreciation differed 
across the major currencies. The dollar showed par-
ticular strength against the Japanese yen, appreciating 
15 percent. The weakness of the yen reflected ongo-
ing structural problems in the Japanese economy and 
its relapse into recession. Relative to the euro, the 
dollar appreciated more than 5 percent, on balance, 
over the course of last year. The dollar's movements 
against the euro appear to have been mainly influ-
enced by market perceptions of the strength of eco-
nomic activity in the United States relative to that in 
the euro area. In the early part of the year, the euro 
weakened as evidence mounted that the economic 
slowdown that was already apparent in the United 
States as the year began was also taking hold in 
Europe. During the summer, the euro rose against the 
dollar as market participants appeared to revise 
downward their expectation of an early U.S. recov-
ery. The euro declined later in the year on signs of a 
further weakening of activity in Europe. Relative to 
the Canadian dollar, the dollar appreciated 6 percent 
in 2001, a move reflecting the depressed level of 
primary commodity prices. 
Against a weighted average of the currencies of 
developing-country trading partners, the dollar appre-
ciated more than 2 percent in real terms. The dollar 
appreciated 3 1/2 percent against a weighted average 
of Asian developing countries, whose economies 
were particularly depressed. The dollar appreciated 
1 percent on a trade-weighted average basis against 
the currencies of Latin American trading partners, 
but it depreciated 5 1/2 percent against the Mexican 
peso. The contrary move against the peso apparently 
reflected a view in the market that Mexico's recent 
success in significantly reducing inflation would 
persist. 
DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. TRADE 
IN GOODS AND SERVICES. 
The U.S. trade deficit in goods and services was 
noticeably smaller in 2001 than in 2000 (table 3). The 
narrowing of the external balance primarily reflected 
the retarding effect on imports of the sharp slowdown 
in economic growth in the United States; that effect 
exceeded the drag on exports arising from slower 
economic growth abroad and the increasing price 
competitiveness of foreign goods as the dollar contin-
ued to appreciate. Table 3. U.S. international trade in goods and services, 1998-2001 
Billions of dollars except as noted 
Item  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Change: 1998-99 
Change: 




Balance (exports less imports)  -167  -262  -376  -348  -95  -114  28 
n/a 
Exports:  933  957  1,066  1,005  25  108  -61  -6 
Exports:Services  262  273  293  284  11  21  -10  -3 
Exports:Goods  670  685  772  721  14  88  -51  -7 
Exports:Capital equipment  300  311  357  322  11  46  -35  -10 
Exports:Aircraft and parts  54  53  48  53  -1  -5  5  10 
Exports:Computer equipment (computers, peripherals, and parts.)  45  47  56  48  1  9  -8  -14 
Exports:Semiconductors  38  47  60  45  9  13  -15  -25 
Exports:Telecommunications equipment  24  25  31  28  1  6  -3  -11 
Exports:Other machinery and equipment  140  139  162  149  0  23  -13  -8 
Exports:Industrial supplies  148  147  172  160  -1  25  -12  -7 
Exports:Automotive vehicles and parts  72  75  80  75  3  5  -6  -7 
Exports:Consumer goods  80  82  91  90  2  9  -1  -1 
Exports:Foods, feeds, and beverages  46  46  47  49  -1  2  2  3 
Exports:Other  23  24  25  25  0  1  0  0 
Imports :  1,100  1,219  1,441  1,352  120  222  -89  -6 
Imports : Services  182  189  217  205  7  28  -12  -6 
Imports : Goods  917  1,030  1,224  1,147  113  194  -77  -6 
Imports : Oil  51  68  120  104  17  52  -16  -14 
Imports : Non-oil  866  962  1,104  1,044  96  142  -61  -5 
Imports : Capital equipment  269  295  347  298  26  51  -49  -14 
Imports : Aircraft and parts  22  24  26  31  2  3  5  18 
Imports : Computer equipment
1  72  81  90  74  9  8  -16  -18 
Imports : Semiconductors  33  38  48  30  4  11  -18  -37 
Imports : Telecommunications 
equipment  16  21  32  24  5  11  -8  -25 
Imports : Other machinery and 
equipment  126  131  150  138  5  19  -12  -8 
Imports : Industrial supplies  152  157  183  174  5  26  -8  -5 
Imports : Automotive vehicles and parts  149  179  196  190  30  17  -6  -3 
Imports : Consumer goods  217  242  282  284  25  40  2  1 
Imports : Foods, feeds, and beverages  41  44  46  47  2  2  1  2 
Imports : Other  38  46  51  51  8  6  0  0 
SOURCE. BEA, U. S. international transactions accounts. 
Exports 
The value of exports of goods and services fell 
$61 billion in 2001 after a rather large increase in 
2000 (table 3). Service receipts declined 3 percent 
after a rise of 7 1/4 percent in 2000; much of the 
decline was in receipts from foreign travelers in the 
United States because travel and tourism plunged 
after the terrorist attacks of September 11. Receipts 
from foreigners for other services changed little, on 
balance, over the year. 
The value of goods exports declined 6 1/2 percent 
after having expanded 13 percent in 2000. The falloff 
affected almost all major categories of goods; the 
largest moves by far, however, were in high-tech 
capital goods and other machinery, a slump reflecting 
the effect of the global slowdown on investment in 
general and especially in spending on high-tech prod-
ucts. The decline in exported industrial supplies was 
mostly accounted for by a fall in prices, but quantities 
also decreased as industrial production declined in 
most of the U.S. principal trading partners. Although 
exports of automotive products fell during 2001 as 
well, shipments of automotive products rose during 
the second and third quarters (especially for parts to 
Canada destined ultimately to be used in U.S. markets 
and for vehicles to Canada), an increase reflecting 
the resilience of the North American consumer. Two 
categories of exports rose during 2001—aircraft; and 
foods, feeds, and beverages. The increase in aircraft 
exports reflected continued strong deliveries to devel-
oping countries, especially Singapore, China, and 
Brazil. Deliveries to Canada rose, while exports to 
Western Europe and Japan fell. The increase in 
exports of foods, feeds, and beverages was primarily 
driven by higher shipments to Latin America, espe-
cially Mexico. 
The widespread nature of the economic slowdown 
caused the value of exported goods to decline for all 
major market destinations (table 4). The bursting of the high-tech bubble concentrated the largest decline 
in total goods exports in those countries in Asia 
(excluding Japan) that are most heavily invested in 
high-tech manufacturing. Exports to these countries 
(excluding Japan) account for 16 percent of U.S. 
goods exports. Exports of goods to Canada (22 per-
cent of all U.S. goods exports), also fell noticeably, 
primarily in the capital goods and automotive prod-
ucts categories. The decline to Mexico (14 percent of 
U.S. exported goods) was primarily in industrial sup-
plies and capital goods and reflected the fall in Mexi-
can industrial production. In contrast, exports of auto-
motive parts to Mexico (mostly shipped back to the 
United States as part of assembled vehicles) declined 
only marginally as U.S. demand for motor vehicles 
held up and exports of vehicles rose slightly. 
Table 4. Distribution of U.S. exports of goods, 
by selected regions and countries, 1998-2001 
Billions of dollars 
Destination  1998  1999  2000  2001  Change, 
2000-01 
All  670  685  772  721  -51 
Western Europe  159  163  179  172  -7 
Canada  157  167  179  164  -15 
Latin America  142  142  170  159  -11 
Mexico  79  87  111  101  -10 
Other  64  55  59  58  -1 
Asia  153  160  192  172  -20 
Japan  56  56  64  56  -8 
Emerging markets  97  104  128  116  -12 
Other  59  53  52  54  1 
Note on emerging markets: 
. China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan, and Thailand. 
SOURCE. BEA, U.S. international transactions accounts. 
In Western Europe, the economic downturn, 
although steep, was less severe than in East Asia and 
the Western Hemisphere; hence, exports to Western 
Europe were somewhat less affected last year and fell 
less than 4 percent. The decline, which was entirely 
in capital goods and industrial supplies, was driven 
by declines in industrial production. Increases were 
recorded in U.S. exports of consumer goods, automo-
tive products and foods. 
The quantity of exports fell 11 percent in 2001 
(Q4 to Q4) after having posted increases the previous 
three years (table 5).  Table 5. Change in the quantity of U.S. exports and imports 
of goods and services, 1998-2001 
Percent 
Item  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Exports  2  5  7  -11 
Services  3  2  4  -7 
Goods  2  6  8  -13 
Capital equipment  4  7  13  -20 
Aircraft and parts  47  -17  -14  -3 
Computer equipment  8  14  23  -23 
Semiconductors  9  35  27  -35 
Other machinery and equipment  -8  8  14  -19 
Industrial supplies  -2  6  7  -7 
Automotive vehicles and parts  -3  2  0  -6 
Consumer goods  3  6  6  -6 
Foods, feeds, and beverages  -3  3  2  5 
Other  15  1  6  -13 
Imports  11  11  11  -9 
Services  8  3  12  -15 
Goods  11  13  11  -7 
Oil  4  -3  12  0 
Non-oil  12  15  11  -8 
Capital equipment  11  18  17  -21 
Aircraft and parts  31  -2  22  2 
Computer equipment  26  25  14  -14 
Semiconductors  -9  34  22  -51 
Other machinery and 
equipment  6  15  17  -20 
Industrial supplies  9  8  1  -3 
Automotive vehicles and parts  16  15  2  -2 
Consumer goods  10  17  16  -5 
Foods, feeds, and beverages  6  11  6  4 
Other  25  9  16  0 
NOTE. Quantities are measured in chained (1996) dollars and change is from 
fourth quarter to fourth quarter. 
Note on capital equipment: 
Data for telecommunications equipment not separately calculated. 
Note on Computer equipment: 
Computers, peripherals, and parts. 
SOURCE. BEA, national income and product accounts; and the Federal 
Reserve Board. 
Table 6. Change in the prices of U.S. exports and imports 
of goods and services, 1998-2001 
Percent 
Item  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Exports  -3  1  2  -1 
Services  0  2  4  0 
Goods  -4  0  1  -2 
Capital equipment  -3  -1  0  -1 
Aircraft and parts  1  3  5  5 
Computer equipment  -13  -7  -4  -5 
Semiconductors  -6  -4  -5  -5 
Other machinery and equipment  0  0  1  0 
Industrial supplies  -7  4  4  -7 
Automotive vehicles and parts  0  1  1  0 
Consumer goods  0  0  0  0 
Foods, feeds, and beverages  -9  -4  0  0 
Other  -3  1  1  -1 
Imports  -5  4  3  -6 
Services  0  3  0  1 
Goods  -6  4  3  -7 
Oil  -36  94  32  -36 
Non-oil  -4  -1  1  -4 
Capital equipment  -6  -4  -2  -4 
Aircraft and parts  2  2  4  3 
Computer equipment  -16  -11  -5  -12 
Semiconductors  -8  -3  -2  -3 
Other machinery and 
equipment  -1  -1  -1  -1 
Industrial supplies  -7  4  11  -14 
Automotive vehicles and parts  0  1  1  0 
Consumer goods  -1  -1  -1  -1 
Foods, feeds, and beverages  -3  -3  -2  -2 
Other  0  0  1  -1 
NOTE. Change is from fourth quarter to fourth quarter; price indexes are 
chain-weighted. See also notes to table 5. 
All major categories of exports declined except that of foods, feeds, and beverages, 
which increased. 
Export prices fell 1 1/2 percent last year (table 6). 
The price declines accelerated over the course of the 
year as economic growth slowed both at home and 
abroad. The price of total merchandise exports fell 
about 2 percent, including a drop of about 4 1/2 per-
cent in the prices of exports of computers and semi-
conductors. A particularly sharp fall (about 7 percent) 
was recorded in the industrial supplies category. 
Prices of aircraft and parts rose 5 percent; prices 
in other major categories were unchanged over the 
course of the year. Prices of services fell a small 
amount, particularly at the end of the year, as demand 
for travel fell off in the wake of the events of Septem-
ber 11. 
Imports. 
The value of imports fell 6 percent in 2001 after a 
rise of 18 percent in 2000; declines were recorded 
in nearly all major categories (table 3). The nominal 
value of service payments dropped 5 1/2 percent last 
year. 
[note: 1]. The ''insurance payment'' component of imported services is 
calculated as the value of premiums paid to foreign companies less 
the amount of losses recovered from foreign companies. In the third 
quarter, the recorded insurance payment was negative because the 
estimated size of losses to be recovered from the attacks of Septem-
ber 11 far exceeded the amount paid for insurance premiums. Under 
the accounting standards for the balance of payments and the national 
income and product accounts (NIPA), the entire amount of an insur-
ance payment is recorded in the quarter in which the incident occurred. [end of note.] 
The plunge in payments for travel and passen-
ger fares after September 11 held down total real 
service payments, bringing their level in the fourth 
quarter 15 percent below that in the second quarter. 
[note 2]. According to NIPA accounting, the value of the one-time insur-
ance payments by foreign insurers is not reflected in NIPA real 
imports of services. The deflator for service imports was adjusted 
down for the third quarter to offset the lower value of service imports; 
the deflator returned to its usual value in the fourth quarter. [end of note.] 
The value of imported goods fell 6 percent last year; 
much of the decrease in capital goods (computers, 
semiconductors, telecommunications equipment, and 
other machinery) reflected the central role played by 
the fall in investment in the U.S. economic slow-
down. Imports of automotive products and industrial 
supplies declined as well. Imports of consumer goods 
and foods were little changed, as U.S. household 
spending was reasonably well maintained. 
Oil Imports. 
The value of U.S. imports of crude oil and petroleum 
products fell more than one-third over the four quar-
ters of 2001 and 14 percent on a year-over-year basis 
(table 3). Oil import prices fell sharply; the quantity 
of imported oil was little changed during the year 
(tables 5 and 6). A number of factors combined to 
cut U.S. domestic demand for oil, which declined 
more than 3 percent: weakness in economic activity, 
reduced airline schedules, the substitution back to 
natural gas as gas prices retracted from record high 
levels, and unusually warm weather late in the year. 
The stability of both imports and domestic pro-
duction, in conjunction with lower domestic fuel 
demand, allowed a recovery of oil inventories from 
the historically low levels that prevailed in 2000 and 
early 2001. 
Chart 6. Change in industrial production, 1977-2001 
[two graphs: Manufacturing, chain-weighted by non-oil imports, and  Manufacturing, chain-weighted by non-oil imports excluding computer  equipment and semi-conductors.]  [graph 1: manufacturing, chain-weighted by non-oil imports. plots that  line plus a line of just Manufacturing, from 1977 through 2001.  They start out 1977 at about 5%. In 1979 they are about 9%. In 1980  chain-weighted is down to about -12%, manufacturing about -6%. 1981  they both go up: chain-weighted to about 85%, manufacturing to about 6%.  They are down again in 1982: chain weighted to about -10%, manufacturing  to about -7.5%. End of 1983 they are up again to about 24% for  chain-weighted, about 14% for manufacturing. Down again and they hit  about 2% in 1985. In 1988 chain-weighted is about 7.5%, manufacturing  about 5%. Beginning of 1991 chain-weighted is about -5%, manufacturing  about -3%. Up again and from 1992 though 2000 chain-weighed varies from  about 5 to 12.5%, manufacturing from about 2.5 to 8%. In 2001  chain-weighted is down to about -8%, manufacturing to about -6%.] 
[Graph 2: Manufacturing, chain-weighted by non-oil imports excluding computer equipment and  semiconductors ( computer equipment consists of computers, peripherals, and parts), and  Manufacturing excluding high-tech ( high-tech goods consist of computers and office equipment,  semiconductors, and communications equipment), plotted from 1977 through 2001.  They start out 1977 at about 4%. In 1979 they are about 7.5%. In 1980 chain-weighted is down to  about -13%, manufacturing about -7.5%. 1981 they both go up: chain-weighted to about 7.5%,  manufacturing to about 5%.  They are down again in 1982: chain weighted to about -11%, manufacturing to about -8%.  End of 1983 they are up again to about 24% for chain-weighted, about 12.5% for manufacturing.  Down again and they hit about 1% in 1985.  In 1988 chain-weighted is about 6%, manufacturing about 3%.  Beginning of 1991 chain-weighted is about -7%, manufacturing about -4%.  Up again and from 1992 though 2000 chain-weighed varies from  about 9 to -2%, manufacturing from about 5.5 to 0%. In 2001  chain-weighted is down to about -8%, manufacturing to about -5%.] 
NOTE. Change is for four quarters. 
Non-Oil Imports. 
The quantity of non-oil imports fell 8 percent in 2001 
(Q4 to Q4, table 5). A sharp decline of 21 percent in 
real expenditures on imported capital equipment reflected the fall in U.S. investment expenditures. In 
the wake of last year's depression in the semiconduc-
tor industry, imports of semiconductor products fell 
51 percent after having registered double-digit gains 
in the previous two years. Similarly, in line with the 
fall of U.S. domestic expenditures on high-tech prod-
ucts in 2001, imports of computer equipment, which 
had registered strong gains the previous three years, 
declined 14 percent. U.S. consumer expenditures held 
up reasonably well during the economic slowdown 
last year. Real expenditures on imports of consumer 
goods fell a relatively mild 5 percent, mostly because 
of a draw-down in retail inventories. 
U.S. non-oil imports, and tradeable goods in gen-
eral, are particularly cyclically sensitive. This cycli-
cal sensitivity appears to reflect the nature of demand 
for importable goods, including import-competing 
goods produced domestically. One way to quantify 
this sensitivity is to aggregate the components of the 
industrial production index for manufacturing using 
non-oil import weights rather than the index with the 
customary domestic value added weights. The value 
of the index calculated using non-oil import weights 
rises more rapidly during booms and falls more 
steeply during downturns than does the index com-
puted using value added weights (chart 6, top panel). 
This relationship persists even if one excludes the 
high-tech products believed to have played a key role 
in the most recent economic slump (chart 6, bottom 
panel). The same factors behind the sharp drop in 
demand for domestically produced tradeable goods 
evident last year are almost certainly responsible for 
the corresponding drop in imports. 
The average price of non-oil goods imports was 
down about 4 percent, as prices of high-tech equip-
ment (computers and semiconductors) continued to 
trend down, while prices of other goods generally 
fell by smaller amounts (table 6). The largest price 
decline among the major categories was in industrial 
supplies, whose price drop of about 14 percent more 
than reversed the previous year's increase. Prices 
of service imports rose 1 percent on average over 
the course of the year. The weakness in import 
prices largely reflected the strength of the dollar, 
which rose about 3 percent on average on an import-
weighted basis in 2001; dollar appreciation more than 
offset a moderate increase in foreign prices. Sharp 
declines in commodity prices in the face of sluggish 
global economic demand also contributed to the 
reduction in the price of imported goods. 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NONTRADE CURRENT 
ACCOUNT. 
The major components of the current account other 
than trade in goods and services are investment 
income and unilateral transfers. 
Investment Income. 
Net investment income is the difference between the 
amount that U.S. residents earn on their direct and 
portfolio investments abroad (receipts) and the 
amount that foreigners earn on their direct and port-
folio investments in the United States (payments). 
Payments and receipts are determined by both the 
size of the investments held and the rates of return 
earned on these investments. Foreign investments 
in the United States greatly exceed U.S. investments 
abroad, and since 1998, payments have exceeded 
receipts. Last year, slower economic growth and 
lower interest rates reduced the rates of return on 
both direct and portfolio investments. As a result, 
payments and receipts both declined (table 7). On 
balance, however, payments fell less than receipts as 
new foreign investment in the United States greatly 
exceeded new U.S. investment abroad (chart 7). 
Table 7. U.S. international investment: Receipts and payments, 1997-2001 
Billions of dollars 
Item  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  Change, 
2000-01 
Net investment income  14  -1  -9  -10  -14  -4 
Direct investment: 
Net income  72  66  67  81  95  14 
Direct investment:Receipts  115  104  124  149  133  -17 
Direct investment:Payments  43  38  57  68  37  -31 
Portfolio investment: 
Net income  -59  -67  -76  -91  -109  -18 
Portfolio investment:Receipts  143  153  159  201  159  -43 
Portfolio investment:Payments  202  221  235  292  268  -24 
SOURCE. BEA, U.S. international transactions accounts. Chart 7. U.S. net international investment: 
Position and income, 1980-2001 
[Graph plotting net income and net position from 1980 though 2001.  They start in 1980 with net income about $30 billion, net position  about $300 billion. They stay at about that level until 1983, then start  sloping down, net position going from about $50 billion in 1987 to  about -$50 billion in 1988. Net income is about $20 billion at this time.  Net position keeps going down, hitting about -$400 billion in 1993 and  ending at about -$1750 billion in 2001. Net income stays at around  $20 billion to $30 billion until 1996, then slopes down, hitting about  -$10 billion in 2001.] 
NOTE. The data are annual. The net position data are averages of the 
end-of-year positions for the current and previous years. The year-end 
position for 2001 was constructed by adding the recorded portfolio invest-
ment flows during 2001 to the recorded year-end position for 2000. The net 
position excludes U.S. holdings of gold and foreign holdings of U.S. 
currency. 
SOURCE. BEA and the Federal Reserve Board. 
Direct Investment Income. 
Net direct investment income—receipts from U.S. 
direct investment abroad less payments on foreign 
direct investment in the United States—increased 
$14 billion in 2001 (table 7). Both direct investment 
receipts (from abroad) and earnings on direct invest-
ment in the United States declined last year. 
The $17 billion decline in receipts reflected the 
slowdown in economic growth abroad and the appre-
ciation of the dollar. The weakness in growth abroad 
reduced profits, and the appreciation of the dollar 
depressed the dollar value of profits earned in foreign 
currencies. These two forces offset the effect of a 
rising stock of direct investment assets. The decline 
in receipts was geographically widespread but was 
greatest in Europe, particularly in the United King-
dom. Most industries were affected adversely, but the 
earnings of affiliates in manufacturing and finance 
(excluding banks) were particularly hard hit. In addi-
tion, the decline in oil prices during the second 
half of last year held down the profitability of U.S.-
based international energy corporations. The falloff 
in receipts reduced the rate of return on the direct 
investment position abroad to 8.7 percent for the 
year—considerably below the robust 10.8 percent 
rate of 2000 (chart 8). 
Chart 8. U.S. direct investment abroad: 
Position and receipts, 1980-2001 
[graph plotting receipts and position, from 1980 though 2001. In 1980  receipts were about $40 billion, position about $400 billion. Around  1986 they start sloping up significantly, in 1994 receipts hit about  $75 billion, position about $750 billion. In 2000 receipts his about  $150 billion, position about $1400 billion. In 2001 receipts is about  $135 billion, position about $1500 billion.] 
NOTE. The data are annual. The net position data are averages using the 
current-cost measures as of year-end for the current and previous years. The 
year-end position for 2001 was constructed by adding the recorded direct 
investment capital flows and current-cost adjustment during 2001 to the 
recorded year-end position for 2000. 
SOURCE. BEA and the Federal Reserve Board. 
The recession in the U.S. economy cut payments 
$31 billion—a decline that in both absolute and rela-
tive terms was much larger than that for receipts. 
Although the stock of foreign direct investment assets 
in the United States rose, the effect on payments was 
more than offset by the effect of the depressed level 
of U.S. economic activity on profits and the effect of 
the decline in oil prices on the profits of international 
energy companies. The profits of every industry suf-
fered, but manufacturing and finance were hardest 
hit, while payments from banking and retail trade 
were almost flat. The recession almost halved the rate 
of return on the direct investment position between 
2000 and 2001—from 5.5 percent to 2.6 percent 
(chart 9). 
Chart 9. Foreign direct investment in the United States: 
Position and payments, 1980-2001 
[graph plotting position and payments from 1980 through  2001. Position has a fairly smooth slope, starting at about  $100 billion in 1980, reaching about $500 billion in 1990,  and ending at about $1475 billion in 2001.  Payments starts at about $6 billion, goes down to about $0  in 1982, back to about $7 billion to $10 billion from 1984  through 1988, then slopes down to about $0 in 1990.  Then rises fairly smoothly until 2000, hitting about  $70 billion. In 2001 it is about $40 billion.] 
NOTE. See notes to chart 8. 
In addition to the cyclical factors that in 2001 
lowered direct investment payments more than 
receipts, the large positive balance on direct invest-ment income was also attributable to the long-
standing lower rate of return on foreign direct invest-
ment in the United States. The rate of return on 
foreign direct investment in the United States is lower 
than that on U.S. direct investment abroad or on U.S. 
resident assets of U.S.-owned firms. A number of 
factors explain the differences between the rate of 
return earned on foreign direct investment and that 
on U.S. resident assets of U.S.-owned firms: higher 
debt-equity ratios and depreciation rates, the indus-
trial composition of foreign direct investment in the 
United States, and the relatively lower level of royal-
ties and dividends received by foreign direct invest-
ment in the United States. 
[note: 3]. See Harry Grubert, "Another Look at the Low Taxable Income 
of Foreign-Controlled Companies in the United States,'' OTA 
Paper 74, U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 1997. [end of note.] 
Portfolio Investment Income. 
U.S. residents earn income in the form of interest and 
dividends on their financial assets abroad. Similarly, 
foreigners earn income on their holdings of U.S. 
financial assets. These earnings are calculated by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the Depart-
ment of Commerce on the basis of estimates of 
holdings, dividend-payout ratios, and interest rates. 
Investment income does not include capital gains 
associated with changes in securities prices. 
Although portfolio income is affected by changes 
in interest rates and the composition of the assets 
held, the primary determinant of net portfolio pay-
ments is the net portfolio asset position (chart 10) 
because the rates of return on portfolio investments 
here and abroad are roughly similar (chart 11). Net 
portfolio income turned negative in 1985 when the 
net portfolio asset position turned negative. The 
marked decline in interest rates last year tended to 
reduce both payments and receipts and to narrow the 
investment income balance. This interest rate effect 
was more than offset, however, by a significant 
decline in the net portfolio position. The negative net 
income balance widened $18 billion, to $109 billion 
(table 7). 
Chart 10. Net portfolio investment: 
Position and income, 1980-2001 
[graph plotting net position and net income from 1980 through  2001. In 1980 net position was about -$50 billion, net income  about $0. In 1981 net position was about $0, net income about  $10 billion. In 1982 to 1984 they stayed in the positive dollars,  Net position not going over $100 billion, net income not over  $10 billion. In 1985 both have gone negative, net position at  about -$100 billion, net income about -$10 billion. Net position  goes down to about -$350 billion in 1989, net income about  -$35 billion. In 1992, Net position was about -$500 billion, net  income about -$30 billion. The both progress downwards. By  2001 Net position reached about -$1950 billion, net income about  -$110 billion.] 
NOTE. The data are annual. The net position data are Federal Reserve 
Board estimates of the average position during the year. Through 2000 these 
are based on quarterly financial flows and year-end position estimates 
published by the BEA. For 2001, the average is based on year-end 2000 
position data and quarterly financial flows during 2001. The net position 
excludes U.S. gold holdings and foreign holdings of U.S. currency. 
SOURCE. BEA and the Federal Reserve Board. 
Chart 11. Rate of return on U.S. portfolio investments, 1980-2001 
[graph plotting two lines: foreign holdings in U.S., and U.S.  holdings abroad.  Foreign holdings start in 1980 at about 9%, U.S. holdings about  10.5%. In 1981 foreign holdings goes up to about 11%, U.S.  holdings to about 13%. In 1987 foreign holdings is down to about  6.5%, U.S. holdings to about 6%. In 1989 Foreign holdings is up  to about 8%, U.S. holdings to about 7.5%. In 1993 they are down,  Foreign holdings to about 4.5%, U.S. holdings to about 3.75%.  In 1995 they are up to about foreign holdings 5.5%, U.S. holdings  to about 5%. In 2001 foreign holdings is down to about 4%, U.S.  holdings to about 3.25%.] 
NOTE. The data are annual. 
Unilateral Transfers. 
Unilateral transfers include government grant and 
pension payments as well as private transfers to and 
from foreigners. In 2001, net unilateral transfers 
recorded a deficit of $50.5 billion, nearly $4 billion 
less than in 2000. A decline of $5 billion in govern-
ment grants offset the $1 billion increase in private 
remittances. 
FINANCIAL AND CAPITAL ACCOUNT 
TRANSACTIONS. 
The counterpart of the deficit on the U.S. current 
account in 2001 was a net financial inflow of foreign 
saving. The slowing of U.S. and foreign economic 
growth over the course of last year had noticeable 
effects on the composition of U.S. capital flows, especially when the extent of the slowing became 
more apparent in the second half of the year. On 
balance, the inflows of net private capital were at the 
unprecedented pace of $455 billion (table 8). 
Table 8. Composition of U.S. capital flows, 1997-2001 
Billions of dollars 
Item  1997  1998  1999  2000 
2001: Year 
2001 
H1  2001: H2 
Current account balance  -140  -217  -324  -445  -417  -220  -197 
Capital account balance  0  1  -3  1  1  0  0 
Financial account balance  272  145  377  443  456  258  198 
Official capital, net  18  -27  55  36  1  -18  19 
Official capital: Foreign official assets in the United States  19  -20  44  38  6  -16  22 
Official capital: U.S. official reserve assets  -1  -7  9  0  -5  -1  -4 
Official capital: Other U. S. government assets  0  0  3  -1  -1  -1  0 
Private capital, net  254  172  322  407  455  276  179 
Private capital: Net inflows reported by U. S. banking offices  8  4  -22  -51  -9  -59  50 
Private capital: Securities transactions, net  225  131  192  308  417  199  218 
Private capital: Private foreign net purchases (+) of U.S. securities  344  267  323  433  514  281  233 
Private capital: Treasury securities  146  49  -20  -53  16  -8  24 
Private capital: Corporate and other bonds  128  172  231  293  371  208  164 
Private capital: Corporate stocks  70  46  113  193  127  82  46 
Private capital: U.S. net purchases (-) of foreign securities  -119  -136  -131  -125  -98  -83  -15 
Private capital: Bonds  -61  -35  -17  -25  13  0  13 
Private capital: Stocks  -58  -101  -114  -100  -110  -82  -28 
Private capital: Stock swaps  -3  -96  -123  -80  -43  -37  -6 
Private capital: Direct investment, net  1  36  146  135  2  36  -34 
Private capital: Foreign direct investment in the United States  106  178  301  288  158  118  40 
Private capital: U.S. direct investment abroad  -105  -143  -155  -152  -156  -82  -74 
Private capital: Foreign holdings of U.S. currency  25  17  22  1  24  5  19 
Private capital: Other  -5  -15  -17  13  22  95  -73 
Statistical discrepancy  -132  72  -49  1  -39  -39  -1 
SOURCE. BEA, U.S. international transactions accounts. 
For private securities transactions, the first half 
of the year was, for the most part, a continuation 
of 2000. U.S. investors increased their demand for 
foreign equities, buying a net of $82 billion, but 
continued to shun foreign bonds. Foreign investors 
purchased a record $281 billion of U.S. securities. 
U.S. corporate bonds attracted record high inflows on 
the heels of record issuance. Strong demand for U.S. 
agency debt continued, as Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac continued to pursue active issuance calendars 
while developing their benchmark programs. 
Although the weight of sagging U.S. equity prices 
slowed acquisition of U.S. equities, the amount pur-
chased was still robust. The one noticeable difference 
between the first half of last year and 2000 was a 
slowing of foreigners' net sales of Treasuries, from 
$53 billion to $8 billion. 
The pattern changed in the second half of the year 
as the slowdown in U.S. and foreign economic growth 
became apparent and as the events of September 
caused global investors to rethink strategies. U.S. 
investors appeared to recoil from foreign markets: 
The modest but steady acquisition of foreign securi-
ties over the past few years almost turned to net sales 
in the second half of the year, when small purchases 
of foreign equities ($28 billion) were substantially 
offset by sales of foreign bonds ($13 billion). At the 
same time, foreign portfolio investment in the second 
half of the year seemed driven in part by flight-to-
quality considerations. Highly rated U.S. securities 
benefited from these considerations, as the latter half 
of the year saw strong net purchases of Treasuries 
and agency securities. Foreigners paused in their 
acquisition of U.S. corporate stocks and bonds in the 
third quarter but resumed strongly in the fourth quar-
ter, perhaps because they believed that the U.S. econ-
omy would recover before major foreign economies 
would. 
The changing economic climate also affected direct 
investment capital flows. During 2000, foreign direct 
investment in the United States averaged more than 
$70 billion per quarter. These flows slowed to about 
$60 billion per quarter in the first half of last year and 
then dropped to only $20 billion per quarter in the 
second half. The decline resulted in part from a 
deterioration in the outlook for corporate profits and from a significant reduction in general merger and 
acquisition activity. By contrast, despite the down-
turn in direct investment receipts, U.S. direct invest-
ment abroad actually increased modestly in 2001, to 
$156 billion. Merger activity remained robust, and 
retained earnings by foreign affiliates of U.S. firms 
held up. 
Capital inflows from foreign official sources were 
slight in 2001, totaling only $6 billion. To put the 
amount in perspective, inflows in 2000 were $38 bil-
lion, roughly what would arise if foreign officials 
reinvested their interest earnings on dollar positions. 
For most countries, changes in official positions in 
the United States were modest. Some of the larger 
changes were in Latin America, where a sizable 
reduction in Argentina's holdings was offset by 
increases by Mexico and Brazil. 
Capital account transactions, which consist mainly 
of debt forgiveness and wealth transfers associated 
with immigration, netted to $1 billion last year, the 
same amount as in 2000. 
PROSPECTS FOR 2002. 
The projection of a consensus of forecasters is for 
economic activity to grow faster in the United States 
than in the major U.S. industrial trading partners in 
2002. If this consensus forecast is borne out, then the 
U.S. external deficit will widen, as U.S. imports of 
goods and services are likely to expand more rapidly 
than U.S. exports of goods and services. The degree 
to which the deficit widens will depend largely on the 
strength of the economic recovery in our principal 
trading partners, on the lagged effects of the past 
appreciation of the weighted average value of the 
dollar on U.S. price competitiveness, and on the 
effects of the world economic recovery on relative 
rates of return on assets, including interest rates. 